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MAGADAN AND THE EVOLUTION
OF THE DAL´STROI BOSSES IN THE 1930s
 
Far more than a place of incarceration, the prison assumed a transcendent
significance throughout the Stalin era. The Gulag in particular became a summation
of the period, for events behind the barbed wire in many respects encapsulated the
key realities of Stalinism. Among a plethora of topics, the legacy of specific camp
regions across Siberia and other northern realms provides one of the most




 of the Soviet 1930s.
This essay will focus upon the history of Dal´stroi, the prison fiefdom in the Soviet
Far East that in time became the largest entity within the nation-wide network of
labor camps. An acronym signifying the euphemistic title of Far Northern
Construction Trust, Dal´stroi proved itself a brutal institution over the years that
fully reflected the impact of the Stalin Terror. In reference to the infamous
archipelago of prison camps, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn remarked that Dal´stroi and
its capital of Magadan formed “the greatest and most famous island, the pole of








Such a regional investigation can be useful on a number of levels, for the focus
of scholarship in Soviet history until recently remained on Moscow and the top
party leadership under Stalin. Local government has for the most part been
overlooked, even though it can reveal much about the nature of power and rule in
the USSR. My emphasis here will be an explication of the chief Dal´stroi bosses,
including an analysis of their backgrounds, motivations, and career paths as well as
generational shifts they represented within the NKVD. In many respects, such an
investigation involves the politics of personnel and the mutable nature of Soviet




 that became ossified in
place, the party and state bureaucracies in the early Stalin era evolved under seismic
shifts that witnessed enormous political turmoil. Events in Magadan paralleled
 
1. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, 
 
The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956; An experiment in literary
investigation
 












Lacking any regional antecedents, both Dal´stroi and its capital of Magadan
came to life only in the early Stalin era and indeed stood as a quintessential




, the Council of Labor and
Defense (
 
Sovet truda i oborony–
 
STO) created the state trust Dal´stroi on
13 November 1931. As the chairman of STO, V. M. Molotov drafted a resolution
defining the parameters and financing of this new organization. Dal´stroi would
concentrate on highway and industrial construction in the valley of the upper
Kolyma River, with a particular emphasis on mineral excavation in the region; it
would control every enterprise and settlement within its venue, stretching down to
Magadan and the Sea of Okhotsk; the Soviet government would initially capitalize
Dal´stroi at twenty million rubles, a sum to be augmented annually by request of the
trust leadership; STO would name a director, who was then to appoint deputies and
assistants in several branches of economic and political operations; and finally,
Dal´stroi would be freed from all local taxes and levies, and would stand above




There should be no surprise that Stalin tapped a veteran chekist as the first
director of prison operations in Magadan. One day following the creation of
Dal´stroi, Molotov named Eduard Petrovich Berzin as its chief. Berzin, a Latvian
Communist from a peasant family near Riga, enjoyed a high profile in the Soviet
Union going back to the Bolshevik Revolution. A veteran of World War I, he had
been a member and then leader of a Latvian regiment that in 1918 became the First
Latvian Rifle Division, one of the units that guarded Lenin and other party leaders
in the days after October. Berzin later helped liquidate the Left-SR uprising in
Moscow and purportedly uncovered an international conspiracy known as the
“Lockhart Affair.” He joined the Cheka in 1922, after which he rose through the
ranks of the OGPU to become the head of a major labor camp in the northern Ural
Mountains, Vishlag, from 1926 to 1931. As director of this site, Berzin had proven
himself an able and competent administrator who could be trusted with the most
vital missions. Considering the importance of the burgeoning gold industry in the
north-eastern region, there is little wonder that Stalin selected a man of wide




By 1932, the outlines of Dal´stroi’s character became clear as Gulag activities
began to transform Magadan. Having arrived in February of that year, Berzin
 
2. For an excellent guidebook on secret police personnel during this time period, see N. V.
Petrov and K. V. Skorkin, 
 
Kto rukovodil NKVD: Spravochnik
 
 (Moscow: “Zven´ia,” 1999).
3. For more particulars on the birth of Dal´stroi, see GAMO (Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv
Magadanskoi Oblasti—State Archive of the Magadan Region), f. r-23ss, op. 1, d. 1, l. 1. 




 (7 November 1934): 2. For a
modern assessment that more objectively reveals the conundrums facing Berzin’s career in




, 17 (September 1988):
28-31. For Berzin’s official appointment as director of Dal´stroi, see GAMO, f. r-23ss, op. 1, d.
1, l. 2. 
 




established a two-story wooden headquarters on the river Magadanka at the edge of
town. Since Dal´stroi was nominally under the command of the Council of Labor





, or North-eastern Camp Administration, as an official arm of
the Gulag providing the labor requirements of Dal´stroi. In terms of institutional




 boss oversaw the growing number of labor camps
in the area on behalf of the trust director. No duality of power ever arose in
Magadan, however, for the Dal´stroi boss remained the local arbiter of events. Such
an arrangement came about in part for propaganda purposes, for it allowed the
Soviet state to refer to the vital functions of the “state trust” while concealing the




Aside from its motivation, however, state rhetoric found ready adherents within
this distant camp fiefdom. Many Gulag bosses, and even some inmates, placed at
least some currency in the promises of official ideology. The idealistic framework
of rehabilitation programs became the intellectual foundation for all endeavors in
the region and gave meaning to several players caught in this bizarre yet tragic
drama. Without question, the Gulag in Magadan comprised a repressive
organization in the early Stalin era responsible for the suffering and deaths of many
prisoners. One key difference from later years, however, was that Soviet goals at
this time did not aim to destroy prisoners as political or ideological enemies of the
state. While later generations of camp bosses regarded the “reforging” campaign as
a useful pretense, the language of correctional labor resonated widely for the first
wave of Dal´stroi administrators. For them, labor competition between brigades of
Gulag captives became a motivational tool wrapped in the revolutionary ideals of
Bolshevism.
Such sentiments reflected the philosophical outlook of the original camp bosses
in Magadan. By definition of their punitive roles as agents of the secret police, both
Berzin and his assistants played a substantial part in the evolution of the Stalin
Terror. But as representatives of state security in the period following the Bolshevik
Revolution, they cannot be easily categorized. Many such officials perpetrated
callous and inhumane acts at various points of their careers. Along with
acknowledging the repression with which they became involved, however, it
should be understood that Berzin’s circle reflected the more temperate values seen
in the generation of Old Bolsheviks who had served the party from the days of
October. The initial Dal´stroi administrators were all quite different from
subsequent and far more sadistic Stalinist henchmen who came to the territory in
the late 1930s. Although they had worked within the secret police for years, the
experience of Dal´stroi’s first managerial generation came largely from the pre-
Stalinist era, when more moderate figures could be found in high positions of the
Cheka or OGPU. Until the Kirov assassination late in 1934, and for a short time
 
5. Such a balancing act of propaganda and misleading explanation continued throughout the
history of Dal´stroi, reflecting both standard practice in the Stalin era as well as the pretense of
continuity with an earlier emphasis on the heroic “opening” of northern territories to Soviet










thereafter, it was not unusual to find agents like Eduard Berzin within the ranks of
the secret police. 
Berzin’s manner as the Gulag chief in Magadan reflected his extensive
education and cosmopolitanism. Having attended art school in Berlin before World
War I, he had imbibed the revolutionary idealism of his formative years before
1920 and was an intellectual peer of leading thinkers in the party. For Berzin, the
reshaping of those arrested and fallen from official grace constituted an important
element in the Soviet experiment. While an acknowledged economic tool for the
Soviet state, the Gulag for him remained a venue of remedial hope to prisoners









). Even though less-educated, many of his subordinates in
Magadan were sympathetic as well to earlier Soviet attitudes far more benign than
those of later Stalinists. As assistants to Berzin at his first Gulag administrative stop
at Vishera in the Northern Urals, a number of Dal´stroi aides retained a long-term





Although Berzin embodied the profile of a “Little Stalin” from the period, he
never exemplified the image of a tyrannical or vainglorious party boss. While
subsequent Dal´stroi administrators more closely matched the despotic persona




character of Gogolian fame, Berzin and his
associates functioned in a more subdued manner. They could be ruthless and
uncompromising, but otherwise comported themselves simply and without
distinctions separating them from their subordinates. An example of this can be





first two years of operation from 1932-1934 and one of Berzin’s closest assistants.
Vas´kov had a notorious but overblown reputation among the prisoners, in later
years embellished by the reminiscences of Varlam Shalamov, as an arbitrary
official who epitomized the suffering in the north-eastern camps. While this
depiction would have been appropriate for later police administrators in the region,
its application to Vas´kov obscured the differences between his generation and the
one that followed. The infamous main stone prison in Magadan, which had
functioned from the earliest times of Dal´stroi’s existence and had entrapped
famous inmates such as Evgeniia Ginzburg and others, became known in camp
slang until the 1950s as “Vas´kov’s House” even though neither its namesake nor
Berzin approached the sadism and depravity of their successors who imparted the





Like Berzin and many of his aides, Vas´kov had been born a peasant and raised
in the rural poverty of late Imperial Russia. He served as a soldier in World War I,
labored in the Ukraine under German occupation, and joined with Red forces
following the October Revolution. Throughout the Civil War and after, Vas´kov
 




 (4 April 1989): 8. 




, trans. John Glad (New York: Penguin, 1994): 152. For
a description of the subsequent and depressing realities to be found in “Vas´kov’s House,”





York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1981): 290-304. 
 




worked in both the Cheka and OGPU, spending his entire Soviet career with the
secret police as low-level agent, researcher, department head, and finally labor
camp administrator. As with most of his original comrades in Magadan, Vas´kov
found himself implementing increasingly harsh policies with the same vision that
had guided him from the earliest days of Soviet rule. The ensuing conflicts would
ensnare and then pass by many officials such as him and Berzin, but should not hide
the fact that these men had followed ideals spawned in their youth, forged in the





The brutal transformation in Soviet politics that undermined Berzin and his
assistants came by the end of 1937, when the Great Purges hit Magadan with full
force as had happened earlier throughout the country. From 1936 to 1938, the
USSR endured a scale of state-sponsored violence unprecedented in either tsarist or
Soviet times. Opening in standard chronologies with Ezhov’s ascension to power as
NKVD commissar in September 1936, the Terror lasted for two years amidst a
sequence of show trials, widespread arrests, and a notable expansion of the Gulag.
Catapulted by Stalin to a dominant position within state and society, the secret
police oversaw all these developments and became the most significant institution
in the Soviet Union. More powerful at this time than even the party, the NKVD
offered Stalin an essential tool in shaping his authoritarian command. In particular,
it helped him entrench a Stalinist elite while simultaneously destroying the




 became a defining episode in the final establishment of Stalin’s rule.
Prior to the NKVD assault on the party and society-at-large, Ezhov instituted a
purge within the Lubianka aimed at establishing his own authority. Although his
predecessor, Iagoda, had already been removed and arrested before Ezhov’s
assumption of power, the purge of “Iagoda men” from across the USSR formed a
top priority for the new commissar in the well-established tradition of “cleansing”
the security apparatus upon a change of its leadership. From late 1936 through all of
1937, the current NKVD boss pursued a methodical elimination of agents from the
Iagoda regime, replacing them with “Ezhov men.” Unlike many other regions,
Magadan for a time weathered this purge from above. Although representative of
an earlier generation of chekists, and thus no longer in favor among the ascendant
Stalinist hierarchy, Berzin remained in charge of Dal´stroi for more than a year
after these alterations in the Soviet power structure. Other than some changes in
local camp operations which reflected national trends, the Gulag in Magadan had








All this changed abruptly in December 1937, when a host of new NKVD agents
arrived in Magadan on Ezhov’s orders. Although assigned as “deputies” to Berzin,
 




 (7 November 1934): 3. 
9. Some authors contend that this situation in Magadan, clearly not on par with the violent
upheaval already taking place elsewhere in the Soviet Union, reflected Berzin’s more moderate
political sentiments and proclivities. See A.G. Kozlov, “Iz istorii Kolymskikh lagerei (1932-










the new security personnel left no doubt as to their actual status. The Kremlin
simultaneously summoned Berzin back to Moscow, an unscheduled trip packaged
in part as a vacation but laden with forebodings. Berzin likely knew the import of
his travel plans as well as the recent flurry of administrative appointments, but
nevertheless worked for several days to show the new staff various aspects of camp
activities. As a sign of their secret mandate from Stalin and Ezhov, however, the
new “assistants” evinced little regard for the Dal´stroi boss and all but ignored him
in their quest to overtake the state trust. Although Berzin technically remained in




 choreographed from the Kremlin.
In the space of a few hours, Berzin had become a “former person” in the city he ran




Ominous coincidences accompanied these power shifts in Magadan, for events
began with the third anniversary of the Kirov assassination. On the night of
1 December 1937, a steamer pulled into Nagaevo Bay on one of the last runs of the
navigation calendar with a fresh complement of prisoners and the Dal´stroi
administrators recently appointed by Ezhov. According to protocol in Magadan,
Berzin greeted his new team at the docks with the usual fanfare of pageantry and
brass bands. As the senior official of the group sent from Moscow, Karp
Aleksandrovich Pavlov shook hands with Berzin as his first deputy and introduced
the remaining crew. Although he probably knew details of Berzin’s imminent fate,
Pavlov said nothing on the subject during the brief municipal tour and
familiarization at regional Gulag headquarters. The only hint was Pavlov’s rank,





thus higher on the career ladder than the presiding Dal´stroi boss. But the most
perilous sign lay at anchor just off the coast, for the 
 
S. S. Nikolai Ezhov
 
 that had
brought the new chekists to Magadan would soon carry Berzin on the first leg of his





After a short time familiarizing the new staff members, Berzin sailed for
Vladivostok to begin a purported “vacation” that included a stop in the Kremlin. He
traveled in the same relative comfort to which he had grown accustomed, and no
aspect of the journey would have struck him as unusual. Following a rough winter
passage on the Sea of Okhotsk, Berzin took the Trans-Siberian Railroad westward
to Moscow as he had done numerous times in the past. Nothing extraordinary
 




 as the head of Dal´stroi, in which he appointed Pavlov as a
“temporary” director during his own absence, see GAMO, f. r-23, op. 1, d. 26, l. 137. These
events in Magadan represented a typical Stalinist phenomenon in which security personnel
assigned as “deputies” soon assumed control of operations, thus offering a smooth transfer of
power. Appointed as a deputy to Ezhov in July 1938, Beria himself assumed command of the
NKVD after his predecessor’s ouster in December of that year. For more on Beria’s
appointment and Ezhov’s downfall, see Robert Conquest, 
 
The Great Terror: A reassessment
 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1990): 431-432, and 
 
Inside Stalin’s secret police: NKVD
politics, 1936-1939
 
 (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1985): 76-99. 









(18 June 1989): 4.
 




happened until the train arrived in the ancient Russian town of Aleksandrov, just
seventy kilometers north-east of the Soviet capital. On Ezhov’s personal order,
Berzin was arrested there on the station platform the night of 19 December, and
subsequently taken by one of the “black raven” cars of the secret police to the




 For fear of causing commotion on
downtown streets in Moscow, particularly when prominent figures were to be
apprehended, the NKVD often struck in outlying regions under the cover of
darkness. Berzin thus spent his last moments of freedom in Aleksandrov, a location





, this tiny municipality had been a temporary headquarters for the tsar





Almost four centuries later, this town and its traditions came back to haunt




 had finally hit Magadan and
claimed one of its first victims from the top of the Gulag elite. Although the
dramatic events of Berzin’s arrest occurred in late December, the die had been cast





with the national hysteria that had overtaken the rest of the country, the NKVD
accused Berzin of being a major figure in a Japanese spy ring from the Soviet Far
East:
“Berzin, Eduard Petrovich, party card no. 0629023, served at the head of a
counter-revolutionary spy-diversionist Trotskyist organization in Kolyma. For
counter-revolutionary sabotage-wrecking activities, he has been arrested by the
organs of the NKVD. Be it resolved that Berzin, Eduard Petrovich be expelled










Aside from heralding the dramatic changes in store for the regional Gulag, the
elimination of Berzin and his staff allowed Stalin to revamp Dal´stroi management
with the pursuit of more radical policies in mind. As a representative of an earlier
generation of officialdom that maintained sympathies for more utopian goals,
Berzin presented an impediment to Soviet “progress” by the time of the Great
 
12. Berzin’s status as an important regional official merited the direct participation of Ezhov,
who signed the arrest warrant to apprehend the Dal´stroi boss in the outskirts of Moscow. See





13. For more on the role of Aleksandrov during the reign of Ivan the Terrible, particularly in









ed. and trans. Hugh F. Graham (Gulf Breeze, Fl.: Academic International Press, 1981): 83-87. 





15. AOSVZ (Arkhivnoe Otdelenie Severovostokzoloto—Archival Department for the
Association of North-eastern Gold—formerly Dal´stroi institutional archive), d. 3418, l. 25.




 (Magadan: Magadanskoe knizhnoe
izdatel´stvo, 1989): 33. For more on Berzin’s downfall, see Roy Medvedev, 
 
Let history judge:
The origins and consequences of Stalinism
 
, ed. and trans. George Shriver (New York:






Purges. The appointment of a new administrative team offered Stalin a chance to
install policy changes in Magadan from his seat in the Kremlin. At the very time
Stalin cabled Berzin with “Bolshevik greetings” in October 1937 for a job well
done at the helm of the local camps, the Soviet leader surreptitiously authorized the
imminent removal of the decorated NKVD veteran. Having decided to overhaul the
trust structure in Magadan long before Berzin’s actual ouster, Stalin simultaneously




Steeled by the brutal circumstances of the era, the new camp elite proved far
more ruthless than Berzin. Armed with the more repressive training then current in
the secret police, which by 1937 accentuated novel methods of torture and prisoner
abuse, most of the NKVD agents just named by Ezhov to the Dal´stroi hierarchy
had taken part in the onset of the Terror in other regions of the USSR. Given clear
instructions from Moscow, these camp bosses came to Magadan with a distinct
mandate to align regional affairs with those across the nation. As head of the state
trust, Stalin assigned a seasoned official with a long service record in the Cheka-
OGPU-NKVD security agencies, K. A. Pavlov. Starting as an investigator for the
Cheka in Kazan after joining the Bolshevik party in 1918, he had risen to a number
of leadership posts within the OGPU and NKVD in Krasnoiarsk, the Crimea, and
the Azov-Black Sea regions. As a “jewel” of the Gulag, however, Dal´stroi came as





As the foremost aide who signed off on many Gulag orders, A. A. Khodyrev
became Pavlov’s chief deputy. The secret police named S. N. Garanin, a notorious




. Iu. M. Gaupshtein
became head of the Dal´stroi Political Section, a position that served as a regional
liaison between atrophied party structures and the secret police in Magadan.
L. P. Metelev and V. M. Speranskii soon filled two posts that had risen in
importance due to the events of the Great Purges: chief procurator and head of the
regional NKVD office, respectively. When the Stalin Terror reached full swing,
local procurators became especially important since they had to “review” all cases
for execution and imprisonment within their jurisdiction even though final
disposition often depended upon the authorization of Moscow. Alongside these
personnel shifts, Dal´stroi’s official title and affiliation changed as well. In April
1938 it became known as the “Main Administration for the Construction of the Far
North” (
 
Glavnoe upravlenie stroitel´stva Dal´nego Severa NKVD SSSR
 
) as the
result of a transfer to the secret police from its prior status as a state trust under the
purview of the Council of Labor and Defense. Even though such alteration on paper
only reaffirmed the effective control which the NKVD had wielded over Dal´stroi
for years, it marked a symbolic confirmation of the metamorphosis in the local




17. For some of these contracts, see AOSVZ, d. 13484, l. 1. 





19. GARF (Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii—State Archive of the Russian
Federation), f. 9401s, op. 1a, d. 22, ll. 62-63. 
 




Aside from these administrative and institutional changes, Dal´stroi became




 throughout the Soviet
Union. Higher arrest rates across the USSR soon resulted in a notable expansion of
the labor camps by the end of the 1930s, with Dal´stroi being one of the foremost
recipients. In short, the state trust could avail itself of a much larger inmate pool
thanks to the bursting prisons in Moscow and other Soviet cities that fed the Gulag
pipeline. By comparison to the 62,703 prisoners within the Dal´stroi system at the
conclusion of 1936, there were 80,258 by the end of 1937 and 93,978 at the close of
1938. Statistics from 1939 unveil the “latent bulge” caused by the Great Purges,
since the Gulag in Magadan by that year had nearly doubled its inmate population to
163,475. As a result of the Stalin Terror, industrial operations throughout the north-
eastern territory finally had an adequate supply of manpower even if it suffered from




Fortified by this veritable army of prison laborers, the new camp bosses
approached their tasks with a perverse vigor. One administrative change in
particular became noteworthy. As a means of streamlining decision-making in
criminal cases across the Soviet Union in the late 1930s, Stalin had resuscitated a




 that had begun as emergency
tribunals at the time of the Civil War. Formed under his instruction in 1937, these









) of the NKVD that oversaw sentencing




 regulated all arrests and
interrogations in the north-eastern territory from the lengthening of Gulag terms to
impositioning of the death penalty. In 1937-1938, this unofficial yet infamous




nation-wide contained the regional party first secretary along with the local NKVD
chief and municipal procurator, the head of Dal´stroi served in place of a party




In comparison with the Berzin administration, the new Dal´stroi management
proved far more ruthless and uncompromising. Younger than Berzin, most of
Pavlov’s staff were members of a different generation within the secret police that
had been forged by the “Revolution from Above.” Few of the officials who first
came to Magadan in December 1937 held top positions in the pre-Stalinist era, and
thus formed a cadre socialized by the harshening policies of the 1930s. They
belonged to the “new class” of managers described by Sheila Fitzpatrick, men who





 While Berzin had been tainted by his association with Old
 
20. GAMO, f. r-23ss, op. 1, d. 6, l. 55. 




























Bolsheviks as well as by a career that had formed long before Stalin came to power,
the current elite at the helm of Dal´stroi represented a more reliable base of support
from the perspective of the Kremlin. As some scholars have noted, these new Gulag
bosses in Magadan proved more cynical, less reflective, and more pliable than the









 by the mid-
1930s, he also favored regional officials from the “new elite” who had an





 The new Dal´stroi administrators fit such prescriptions. Unlike Berzin and
many of his assistants, they were poorly educated and decidedly uncosmopolitan.
Even the lofty ideals of the October Revolution, little of which could be seen from
the perspective of the Gulag, went beyond their limited comprehension about the
goals of Soviet power. Never the type to ask probing questions on policy, they took
their marching orders from the bureaucratic chain of command. Although some of
them had proven administrative competence, many were chosen for personal
characteristics at a premium during the Great Purges: brutality and intemperance.
Garanin in particular offered these qualities, for he had emerged from an aimless














 boss, Garanin had official jurisdiction over the actual functioning
of the labor camps. In that role, he acted with a vengeance unseen in Magadan prior
to Berzin’s arrest. Under broad guidelines established by his Dal´stroi overlords,
Garanin routinely signed execution orders for prisoners who had been accused
within the camps of lesser charges such as embezzlement of “socialist property,”
refusal to work, “counter-revolutionary sabotage in production,” escape attempts,
or “camp banditry.” On 23 December 1937, for instance, he authorized the shooting




 At times, Garanin
appeared unconstrained by the bureaucratic niceties of condemnation procedures.
According to camp tales, he occasionally drew his revolver and shot prisoners on




23. A.I. Shirokov and M.M. Etlis, 
 
Sovetskii period istorii Severo-Vostoka Rossii
 
 (Magadan:
Mezhdunarodnyi pedagogicheskii institut, 1993): 7-8. 
24. This emphasis ended by 1939, when overt Soviet discrimination in favor of workers and
peasants lessened across the USSR. See S. Fitzpatrick, 
 
Education and social mobility in the
Soviet Union, 1921-1934
 
 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979): 234-254.
25. The legends of Garanin, which percolated into the camp memoirs of Ginzburg and others,




 boss while overplaying his role. See A.G.





26. OSF ITs UVD (Otdelenie Spetsial´nykh Fondov, Informatsionnyi Tsentr Upravleniia
Vnutrennykh Del—Department of Special Fonds, Information Center for the Administration of
Internal Affairs), f. 12-u, op. 1, d. 4, l. 127. 
27. Some of this has been recounted in R. Medvedev,
 












, Garanin seemed to dictate a
summary justice in this remote prison realm. Known to roam Gulag zones with a
swaggering authority that terrorized inmates, he played to the hilt his role as the
visible arbiter of Soviet law throughout the subarctic frontier. Unlike his
supervisors in either Magadan or the Lubianka, Garanin was an important NKVD
official whom the prisoners might glimpse with some regularity. As the most
apparent and hated symbol of state retribution in the territory for most of the Terror,









term, however, became somewhat of a misnomer. In spite of such a moniker, which
evolved from the limited viewpoint of camp inmates, Garanin controlled neither the
formulation of key Gulag policy nor the evolution of local events. Fully subservient









By the spring of 1939, the extreme political violence of the Great Purges came to
a halt in Magadan as it had months earlier throughout most of the Soviet Union. As
a precursor to this denouement, Stalin had issued a signal at the November 1938





purportedly at fault for the Great Purges and a reiteration of excuses long used by
the Kremlin, must be stamped out across the USSR. More important, Stalin’s
contemporaneous removal of Ezhov from power intimated that the Terror had
drawn to a close. Extricating the country from the grip of this mayhem, however,




 following the plenary session in Moscow. Although Garanin
himself had been removed in October 1938, after which local police measures
faded in severity, Pavlov and Khodyrev remained in power through the first half of
1939. NKVD activities subsided across the region by May of that year, when the
Kremlin transferred the Dal´stroi chief back to Moscow for reassignment at the
Lubianka while arresting or otherwise removing most of his assistants. Just as
Evgeniia Ginzburg and Sergei Korolev arrived as prisoners in Nagaevo Bay in the
summer of 1939, Magadan underwent a major transition. 
In the wake of yet another overhaul in the administration of Dal´stroi, the territory
again experienced a change in priorities. The pendulum began to swing back toward
the goals of the period before 1937, as Gulag administrators regained their previous
focus upon gold production. Spurred once more by the financial necessities of the





signified a return to Berzin’s industrial emphasis, it did not imply the reintroduction
of the more “benevolent” attitudes of that era. The Stalin Terror left an indelible mark




, Magadan had to traverse a path between the competing legacies of
Berzin’s economic record and the searing impact of the Great Purges. 
 














The end of the Stalin Terror in Magadan signalled a number of dramatic changes
in the region. Reassigned to secret police work in Moscow, Pavlov left his deputy
Khodyrev at the helm of Dal´stroi until a new management team could be formed




took the blame for the “excesses from below.” Speranskii was arrested and shot














 chief was sentenced to eight years




 The circle of political
irrationality had closed, for Garanin became an inmate on the same charge from
Article 58 as had many of those whom he once persecuted. After several years in
the Gulag, he died from exhaustion in the Pechora region. The secret police




 Most important, Stalin




 just as he had raised it: by naming





As in December 1937, Stalin sought management for the state trust in a cohort of
officials trained largely since the late 1920s. Unlike Berzin, they were not tainted
by pre-Stalinist experiences and ideals. One such figure, Ivan Fedorovich
Nikishov, became the new Dal´stroi boss at the end of 1939. While serving in
various areas of the Soviet Union, Nikishov had risen slowly within the ranks of the
secret police. He studied in 1928-1929 at the Higher Border Patrol School, an
NKVD institution in Moscow, from where he graduated to work in Kaluga and
other locations throughout the early 1930s. In 1934, Nikishov became a supervisor
of the NKVD Administration for Internal Troops in central regions near Voronezh,
whereafter he went to the Caucasus as chief of the NKVD Administration for
Border and Internal Troops in Azerbaijan by 1937. Nikishov transferred after one
year to Leningrad where, as the overseer of a similar detachment, he rose in
visibility due to the importance of the city. In November 1938, Ezhov promoted
him to be presiding head of the NKVD in Khabarovsk, a position that he held for
ten months. Summoning him thereupon to Moscow, Stalin met with Nikishov in the
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Nikishov’s assignment to Magadan came as no surprise, for he had already
served a similar role as secret police chief in Khabarovsk. More critical, his rise to
these key positions dovetailed with Beria’s assumption of power, an association
which saved him from the purge of Ezhov and his closest assistants after November
1938. As a result of fortuitous timing, Nikishov entered into the ranks of “Beria’s
men” just as they began to consolidate power across the USSR. Following the
removal of Ezhov and his aides, Beria formed a “family circle” of Georgian
associates in the top hierarchy of the secret police. Among others, Beria appointed
Mikhail Gvishiani to be chief of the secret police in the Soviet Far East with
immediate supervision over all regional labor camps. Perhaps on account of his
previous work in the Caucasus in 1937, Nikishov may have established tight bonds
with a number of these officials now serving in senior positions. Such connections
likely ensured him the lengthy nine-year career he would enjoy at the helm of
Dal´stroi.34 
Under Beria’s oversight, Nikishov assembled a new staff upon his arrival in
Magadan on 12 December 1939.35 G. A. Korsakov became deputy director of the
state trust, the position formerly held by Khodyrev. In place of Speranskii,
Nikishov assigned G. F. Okunev as the operational head of the NKVD office in
Magadan. Another important official of the restructured crew, I. K. Sidorov,
assumed leadership of the Dal´stroi political department. A host of other personnel
filled in the secondary positions within the local Gulag hierarchy.36 While
transcripts of Nikishov’s October meeting with Stalin in the Kremlin are not
available, this administrative overhaul in Magadan assuredly came from
instructions by the Soviet leader. Chastened by the fate of his two predecessors at
Dal´stroi, one of whom had been arrested and shot while the other was summarily
removed upon the orders of Moscow, Nikishov would not likely have made any
move without a blessing from above.37 
Stalin even instituted a number of changes in Magadan that predated Nikishov’s
arrival, after which they became marching orders for the new Dal´stroi chief. On
25 June 1939, Beria reorganized the NKVD apparatus in Magadan to match his
“reforms” at the national level which had been focused upon strengthening
bureaucratic lines of authority.38 Before that, on 11 June, his assistant Vsevolod
Merkulov had enumerated new regulations concerning the registration of prisoner
34. On Beria’s rise to power and his installment of the Georgian “family circle” at NKVD
headquarters, see again A. Knight, op. cit.: 90-93. See also R. Conquest, The Great Terror, op.
cit.: 627.
35. Following the Kremlin meetings with Stalin and the lengthy trip across Siberia, Nikishov
arrived to begin work in Magadan on this date. See Sovetskaia Kolyma (14 December 1939): 4. 
36. T.S. Smolina, “ Kolyma–god 1939,”art. cit.: 4-5. 
37. Using previous events as a guide, Nikishov’s meeting with Stalin in the Kremlin in October
1939 presumably dealt with fine details of policy governing the activities of the new Gulag
administration in Magadan. For further information, see again A.G. Kozlov, Magadan, op. cit.:
92.
38. GARF, f. 9401s, op. 1a, d. 34, l. 59. 
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deaths that would augment record-keeping and refine central knowledge and
control over the inmate population.39 On 13 July, another Beria subordinate, Sergei
Kruglov, communicated to Nikishov revamped standards for Sevvostlag prisons.40
While reflecting Beria’s attempt to reconstitute the apparatus of the secret police so
as to bolster his own position, such changes also embodied the refinement of central
control over far-flung camp enterprises. 
Taking cues from Moscow, the new Dal´stroi chief proved savvy enough even
to replicate the imagery and style of his Lubianka superiors. Consistent with Beria’s
official persona as a reformer out to mitigate the effects of the Great Purges,
Nikishov cultivated the impression of a regional boss striving to curtail the
lawlessness of the preceding epoch. As Beria had done in the center, Nikishov
presented himself in Magadan as a sober administrator who would provide sensible
leadership in the wake of such irrational violence. The so-called “Beria thaw”
proved to be a mirage in the long run, however, for the main purpose of Beria and
subordinates like Nikishov was to establish efficiency and order in place of earlier
policies that had caused obvious administrative dysfunction throughout the Soviet
bureaucracy at the time of the Ezhovshchina. Aiming less to repudiate the Stalin
Terror than to correct its imbalance, the new NKVD bosses streamlined police
measures so as not to harm other state activities such as industrial production.
Moreover, the overt repression of the Great Purges had already played its role from
the viewpoint of political control and did not have to be repeated under Beria.41 
The “reformist” course charted by Beria and his subalterns like Nikishov
revealed that public image mattered in the USSR, even in the subarctic desolation
of Magadan. Untarnished by participation in the Garaninshchina, Nikishov and his
staff offered a clean break for a camp management eager to dispel the memory of
1937-1938. In order to distance themselves from the atrocities of their
predecessors, the new Gulag elite in Magadan began to deplore in public the
“provocative attacks” and “slander” hurled against party members by Ezhov’s
minions in 1937-1938. In agreement with Stalin’s official line on correcting the
“exaggerations from below,” Dal´stroi officials also inveighed against the
“unlawful” accusations and policies that had spun out of control throughout the
territory. The Nikishov administration furthermore elicited a mea culpa from many
former Dal´stroi employees during the Great Purges, such as N. A. Abramovich,
which helped to separate the present era from the one that had preceded it: 
“Fate cast for me, a man, to play a shameful and accursed role in that difficult
time. This now brings only bitter regrets over our wasted strength, health, and
39. Ibid., ll. 35-36. 
40. Ibid., l. 153. 
41. See A. Knight, op. cit.: 92-93. Solzhenitsyn has argued that the concomitant release of
prisoners during the “Beria thaw,” the rare “reverse wave” in his description, came only as a
political move to enhance the reputation of Beria while heaping all the blame upon Ezhov for
the atrocities of the Great Purges. See A. Solzhenitsyn, op. cit.: 76. 
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energy. For no purpose, we chekists faithfully met our assigned tasks with the
sincere belief that what we were doing was right.”42
Coupled with the regretful paeans of similar NKVD agents who had been active in
Magadan throughout the Stalin Terror, these “confessions” became standard fare in the
Gulag well into the early 1940s. As part of a political show scripted from the Kremlin,
this and other statements aimed to mollify a population traumatized by recent events.
Such repentful tones for a time dominated public discussions in Magadan.
Serving as a muted catharsis for the Soviet system, the confessional mood revealed
Nikishov’s intentions to clear the ground for policy changes. While not atoning for
the “errors” of their predecessors, the new Dal´stroi administrators interpreted such
public apology as a breakwater for their own rule. After a brief period of
disclaimers, Nikishov would turn his full attention toward economic goals
mandated by the Soviet government. The reorientation of the regional Gulag as an
important “shop” for the country demanded at least a partial repudiation of the
Great Purges. Alongside this came a curtailment of the incendiary rhetoric from the
Ezhovshchina, which appeared striking in comparison with the more sober party
rhetoric now trumpeting the attainment of record mining quotas as the overarching
objective in the upcoming period.43
In conjunction with this industrial re-emphasis, Nikishov also had to stifle the
ideological attack against Berzin. Since the first Dal´stroi boss had presided over
the most successful economic achievements of the state trust, it became imperative
for Nikishov to claim Berzin’s mantle as an efficient manager. The rampant
vilification of him thus came to an end along with the Terror. Regardless of the
political crimes charged against Berzin, insights into his managerial acumen
provided a key for recapturing the record pace of the early-to-mid 1930s. Leaning
upon the proven usefulness of Berzin’s material incentives as well as his campaigns
of “socialist competition” and Stakhanovism within the camps, themes being
reaccentuated by Moscow in these more pragmatic times, Nikishov hoped to find
the right mix of initiatives to revive prison enterprises. By invoking the
programmatic successes and productive ethos of the Berzin era, Nikishov sought to
reproduce the proportionally higher output figures attained before 1937.44 
On account of Berzin’s unrehabilitated status as a “nonperson,” however,
Nikishov’s accent upon Dal´stroi’s initial achievements mandated a tightrope act of
interpretation.45 The new camp boss and his staff therefore invoked Magadan’s
42. Quoted in T.S. Smolina, “ Kolyma–god 1939,” art. cit.: 4-5. 
43. This emphasis upon production became a constant refrain in local newspapers. For
example, see Sovetskaia Kolyma (5 December 1940): 3. 
44. On the flip side, Nikishov never embraced Berzin’s “idealism” as Dal´stroi remained a
more cynical institution after 1937. See A.S. Navasardov, “Iz istorii stroitel´stva Kolymskoi
trassy (1928-1940 gg.),” in S.G. Bekarevich, ed., Kraevedcheskie zapiski (1991): 25. 
45. Berzin remained a “nonperson” in the USSR for eighteen years, from his death in 1938 until
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earliest history with utmost caution, an official prudence which had other roots as
well. As specious as the charges against Berzin had been during the
Garaninshchina, the basic storyline of Japanese espionage in the region could not
be dropped altogether from public reference. In particular, Soviet border clashes
with the Japanese in 1938 and 1939 resuscitated tensions. The specter of further
international conflict at this time, dramatically evident in Germany’s recent
invasion of Poland as well as Japan’s activities in both China and Korea, only
bolstered paranoid views that the USSR was under siege from external enemies. As
a purported spy ringleader, Berzin had to remain a suspect figure if only to maintain
the plausibility of Stalinist scenarios. Eventual hostilities with the Axis powers
entrenched this viewpoint, making Nikishov’s task of historical revisionism an
even more selective one. As the war effort deepened, however, the need to
resuscitate the productive capacity of state enterprises meant that figures like
Berzin could not entirely be forgotten.46
Over the course of the 1930s, the transformation of camp life in the territory
found reflection in the personages who ran the state trust. Appointed by order of
Stalin, the Dal´stroi bosses reflected shifting Soviet priorities. A pre-Stalinist
official with vivid memories of 1917, Berzin proved a relative idealist as a camp
official who took seriously at least some of the utopian protestations of Marxism-
Leninism. Although the Gulag remained a hostile environment for prisoners during
his tenure, Berzin ran a far more moderate regime than his successors. The onset of
the Great Purges in Magadan, as across the USSR, proved a turning point.
Transformed by the repressive ethos of the Garaninshchina, Dal´stroi shed the
pretense of any benign role after Berzin’s ouster. Aligning himself with national
trends, Pavlov repudiated most of his predecessor’s temperate initiatives while
stiffening camp practices to the great detriment of inmates. Nikishov followed suit,
even though his professed role was to resuscitate industrial growth in the Magadan
camps while modifying the impact of the Terror.
Socialized by the harsh experiences of the Stalin era, which by then had already
included the collectivization campaign and repeated acts of political terror,
Dal´stroi officials after Berzin behaved with a wanton attitude toward higher party
ideals. In contrast to the first local Gulag boss, who had come of political age at the
dawn of Soviet power, most administrators in Magadan by the late 1930s and early
1940s formed a younger cohort with little practical memory even of NEP. Whether
in policy or practice, they were neither utopian nor liberal. While some were
outright sadists, such as Garanin, most were simply pragmatists who had few
illusions about their positions or Stalin’s expectations. Sent directly from Moscow,
they arrived in Magadan armed with the economic and political mandates given
46. Tangible reasons prevented Nikishov from ignoring Berzin’s legacy entirely. Aside from
the industrial achievements attained by the first Dal´stroi chief in the Magadan region, most of
the infrastructure of camps, roads, power stations, and state farms throughout the territory had
been built by Berzin. See ibid., as well as A.G. Kozlov, “Pervyi direktor,” art. cit.: 31.
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them in the Kremlin. Aside from focusing upon the industrial mission of the state
trust, they maintained an unyielding camp regimen not to be dismantled until the
mid-1950s.
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